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Abstract
UCONABC is an emerging access control framework
that lacks an administration model. In this paper we
define the problem of administration and propose a
novel administrative model. At the core of this model
is the concept of attribute, which is also the central
component of UCONABC . In our model, attributes
are created by the assertions of subjects, which as-
cribe properties/rights to other subjects or objects.
Through such a treatment of attributes, administra-
tion capabilities can be delegated from one subject to
another and as a consequence UCONABC is improved
in three aspects. First, immutable attributes that
are currently considered as external to the model can
be incorporated and thereby treated as mutable at-
tributes. Second, the current arbitrary categorisation
of users (as modifiers of attributes), to system and ad-
ministrator can be removed. Attributes and objects
are only modifiable by those who possess administra-
tion capability over them. Third, the delegation of
administration over objects and properties that is not
currently expressible in UCONABC is made possible.
Keywords: Access Control, Trust Management, Us-
age Control, Authorisation, Administration.
1 Introduction
The advent of the Internet and large scale Intranet
has led to the emergence of a plethora of new appli-
cations (e.g., resource sharing, electronic commerce,
health care systems) in which authorisation is signif-
icantly different from that of more traditional cen-
tralised or closed systems, from two main perspec-
tives: the absence of a central administrator and the
lack of prior knowledge held by resource providers and
access requesters about each other.
UCON is a new and emerging abstract1 autho-
risation framework that attempts to combine fea-
tures from traditional access control, trust manage-
ment and digital rights management. The concept of
UCON was introduced by Park and Sandhu (Sandhu
& Park 2003, Park & Sandhu 2002b) and further re-
fined into a formal model of UCONABC that specifi-
cally focuses on the authorisation, obligation and con-
dition aspects of access control (Park & Sandhu 2004).
At the heart of UCONABC lies the concept of at-
tributes and the primary contribution of the model
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1Note that abstractness is a major design principle for UCON.
By abstract we mean it must be independent of any specific existing
language, policy or model.
is the manipulation of attributes throughout an ac-
cess process. In this model, attributes are consid-
ered abstractly as the properties (e.g., role, classi-
fication, credit, clearance) of subjects or objects in
the model. They are also conceptually divided into
two categories, immutable and mutable. The former is
left out of the UCONABC model, as they are admin-
controlled, meaning only an administrator can modify
them. Mutable attributes are those whose value can
change throughout an access process, usually as a con-
sequence of subjects’ actions. To eliminate complexi-
ties such as who has a right to modify the attributes
and how rights are to be assigned and enforced, mu-
table attributes are considered to be modified by the
system (i.e., system-controlled), an abstraction for a
trusted process or user (Park & Sandhu 2004, Park
et al. 2004).
The need for a clear definition of an administra-
tion and attribute management model for UCONABC
has been mentioned several times in the literature
(Park & Sandhu 2002b, Sandhu & Park 2003, Park &
Sandhu 2004, Park et al. 2004, Zhang et al. 2004) but
left aside for future research. Park and Sandhu (Park
& Sandhu 2004), the originators of the UCON concept
suggest that “delegation of rights is among the crucial
issues that should be covered within UCON frame-
work. In addition, there should be a clear description
of administration issues. We believe further studies
on these issues will provide more comprehensive solu-
tion approaches for the area of usage control.”. This
need has also been noticed by others (Zhang et al.
2007, Luo et al. 2008, Wang & Wang 2007) and at-
tempts have been made to address it through anno-
tating the UCONABC model with ad-hoc delegation
or administration elements. These approaches and
their shortcomings will be discussed in more detail in
Section 3.
We argue that administration is a separate mat-
ter, orthogonal to UCONABC itself. Administration
deals with the question of who is supposed to pro-
vide the required policies for an authorisation. We
refer to this as the Administrative Model. The lat-
ter determines who must be authorised/denied given
the relevant authorisation policies, which we refer to
as the Usage Model. We believe that in the con-
text of UCONABC , administration must be addressed
through the management of attributes. Therefore,
an administration model defines what attributes are,
where they come from and who can manipulate them.
Further, since objects have attributes, through the
administration of attributes, such an administrative
model will allow the administration of objects as well.
Hence, the connection between the administration
model and the UCONABC model stems from the fact
that the former defines attributes and the latter em-
ploys them for an authorisation process.
This paper proposes a novel administrative model
for UCONABC , where the properties/rights of a sub-
ject or an object are defined by attributes which are
formed through assertions made directly by a sub-
ject or indirectly by others to whom he/she delegated
the administration capability. A key contribution of
the proposed model is its introduction of a two layer
structure which comprises a peer model and autho-
riser model. The peer model provides an expressive
unrestricted environment where every subject may
state their beliefs about properties and rights of other
subjects/objects. Through this, attributes become
source centric. Initially the issuer of an attribute is
the sole administrator of the attribute, until they as-
sert otherwise. The implication of this is the ability
to identify who can modify or delegate properties and
rights. The authoriser model, sits on top of the peer
model and is responsible for determining whose as-
sertions are to be taken into account for an access
request. In order to make such an adjudication the
model depends on the system/application wide ad-
ministrative policy which we assume subjects operat-
ing within the model have consented to. We suggest
no specific policy but provide some examples of well
known policies such as owner-based, used in Digital
Rights Management (DRM) or privacy aware applica-
tions, and administrator-based, for traditional access
control systems.
Through such a formulation of the administration
problem we make the adequacy of trust management
techniques for the administration of UCONABC evi-
dent. In order to communicate our ideas more con-
cretely we use the syntax of the SecPal language
(Becker et al. 2007). We use some of the basic con-
structs that exist in almost any trust management
language to show its function in the proposed admin-
istrative model. However, the model is not defined or
limited by SecPal, since it is not part of the proposed
extensions. This is necessarily in keeping with the
abstract nature of UCONABC .
Our administrative framework specifically im-
proves UCONABC in three aspects. First, it lifts
the current assumption of a single administrator
who issues attributes and the authorisation poli-
cies. Second, it removes the arbitrary division
of attributes into mutable (those that are system-
controlled) and immutable attributes (those that are
admin-controlled). Hence, all attributes are condi-
tionally mutable and can be treated within the cur-
rent UCONABC model. Consequently, it would allow
the construction of a model with either top-down or
bottom-up propagation of administration, in which,
administration capabilities over attributes and ob-
jects are delegatable and the administration root is
dynamically determined with respect to a specific ap-
plication policy. Such dynamism is actually one of
the strong advantages of the proposed model. Third,
the arbitrary categorization of users as modifiers of
attributes into system and administrator is removed.
There only exist subjects, who can modify the at-
tributes they administer or for which they have been
delegated administration capabilities.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Sec-
tion 2 outlines the main concepts of UCONABC , on
which our paper is based. This is followed by Section
3 that reviews related approaches to the administra-
tion problem. Section 4 introduces a motivating ex-
ample. The actual administration model is described
in Section 5 and this is followed by Section 6, where
we make concluding remarks.
2 UCONABC Components
The UCONABC model (Park & Sandhu 2004) extends
traditional access control to address the problem of
authorisation not only at the time of access to a re-
source but also during its usage. The main compo-
nents of the model as shown in Figure 1, are the Sub-
jects (S) that wish to use their rights (R) over certain
Objects (O). Subjects and objects are endowed with
Attributes (A) that capture the properties of these
entities. Authorisation (AU) is a functional predi-
cate that evaluates usage requests based on the sub-
jects’ and objects’ attributes, the requested rights,
the policy model, and returns either yes or no. In
addition to authorisation there are two other decision
factors, oBligation (B) which is a functional predicate
that ensures certain obligation actions are performed
by the subject and Condition (C) predicates, where
environmental requirements that have to be satisfied
are checked as a part of the usage decision process.
The question of how the propositional value of these
predicates are determined is currently external to the
model.
Rights
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  Usage  
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Figure 1: UCONABC Model
Two innovations for UCONABC are attribute mu-
tability and continuity. Different from other access
control models, subject or object attributes in this
model can not only be modified by the administra-
tor, but can also be changed as a side effect of a
subject’s usage of an object. However, there is a
special user called system who is assumed to observe
these actions and make proper updates. The con-
cept of continuity proposes that the system repeat-
edly checks the validity of subjects’ rights during the
access. When a right is revoked, the access will be
terminated on time. These two properties uniquely
identify UCONABC and are indispensable in an open
network environment.
3 Related Works
In UCONABC (Park & Sandhu 2004) attributes are
the central component of the model as access deci-
sions are based on the state of subjects’ and objects’
attributes, which may change and subsequently influ-
ence the usage control decision. Despite the impor-
tant role of attributes in usage control, UCONABC
does not address challenges regarding the manage-
ment of attributes, focusing instead on user authorisa-
tion issues. However, the need for an attribute man-
agement mechanism has been noted by UCONABC
designers (Sandhu & Park 2003, Park & Sandhu
2002b, 2004).
In the original UCONABC papers of Park et al.
(Park & Sandhu 2002b, 2004), attributes are divided
into ‘admin-controlled’ and ‘system-controlled’. The
admin-controlled attributes are said to be immutable
in that they are only assigned to subjects and ob-
jects by administrator actions and cannot be modified
by the system automatically, whilst system-controlled
attributes can be updated as side effects of user’s us-
age of objects. Park et al. (Park et al. 2004) fur-
ther refine admin-controlled attributes to be either
‘security-officer-controlled’ or ‘user-controlled’, where
the user could be either the subject possessing the
property, ‘self-controlled’, or some other user within
the model, ‘non-self-controlled’. They leave further
details on administration issues for future work. As
we will discuss in Section 5, such a syntactic classifi-
cation of attributes and users is rather arbitrary and
meaningless without being able to define attributes
and determine how and by whom they can be up-
dated. Furthermore, the above papers always imply
the need for a central administrator who assigns at-
tributes and rights to users. This is inconsistent with
one of the primary design goals of usage control, to
address open environments. The issues regarding del-
egation are also not considered.
In addition to the above mentioned papers there
are a number of other proposals that attempt to
provide an administration/delegation for UCONABC .
Zhang et al., (Zhang et al. 2007) proposed UCOND,
a delegation model for UCONABC . Their view of del-
egation is limited to access level permissions, where a
user grants some of their own rights (e.g., read/write)
to another user. They introduce several entities
specifically for delegation purposes: ‘delegator’, ‘del-
egatee’, ‘delegation context’ and ‘permission’, as well
as attributes, referred to as ‘delegation attributes’.
The contribution of their proposal is to suggest the
importance of expressing the relationships between
subjects. However, the proposed extension arguably
violates the generalised and abstract nature of the
original UCONABC model. Further, there is no clear
link between the proposed model and the UCONABC
model.
Luo et al. (Luo et al. 2008) attempt to integrate
UCONABC with ideas from trust management to in-
troduce a distributed delegation model, referred to
as UTCDM . They use directed graphs as a repre-
sentation tool to express delegation relationships and
to provide a credential discovery algorithm. While
credential discovery is one of the main areas in trust
management, the link between UCONABC and their
proposed mechanism is unclear. Many well studied
trust management and credential discovery frame-
works already exist (Blaze et al. 1998, Li et al. 2003)
that could be used to address the issues proposed
in this paper. However, UCONABC is meant to
be an abstract framework, thus their proposal ar-
guably violates the abstractness principle inherent in
UCONABC .
Wang et al. (Wang & Wang 2007) use
UCONABC ’s abstract concept of attribute as ‘cred-
ibility’ to express the trustworthiness of subjects who
attempt to access an object. From this perspective
their proposal is trivial as the concept of attribute
in UCONABC is clearly abstract enough to express
trust, credibility, role, etc. They also attempt to es-
tablish that, by using attributes as certificates, one
can reduce certain complexities such as certificate re-
vocation and certificate discovery that exist in certifi-
cate based access control models. However, it is not
clear how their proposal would reduce such complexi-
ties. There are several theoretical and practical issues
that the paper fails to address, such as: who is able to
assign attributes to subjects regardless of what they
represent, and, how and by whom these attributes are
to be modified.
Originator Control (ORCON) is a proposal for
an access control policy in which recipients of in-
formation need to gain the originator’s approval for
the further re-dissemination of the information (Park
& Sandhu 2002a). They put emphasis on the im-
portance of adapting the originator control policy
within UCON as a means for it to go beyond tradi-
tional access control, trust management models and
DRM. However, the paper leans toward implementa-
tion rather than an abstract theoretical work. They
describe several ways in which licenses and delega-
tion tickets could be used to control redistribution of
a resource. As we will describe in Section 5, explicit
description of ownership and owner-based control are
two examples of a system policy that an abstract
framework like UCON must be capable of modelling,
but it must not be limited only to this.
On a similar ground to our work, Firozabadi et al.
(Firozabadi et al. 2002) and Wood et al. (Wood &
Fernandez 1979) address the requirements of a de-
centralised administration/authorisation model and
distinguish between two kinds of delegations: dele-
gation of authority at management level and delega-
tion of permission at request level. The delegation
of authority allows an entity to hand off authorities
to another entity such that the receiver can express
authorisation policies on behalf of the sender. On
the other hand, permissions are privileges to exercise
the rights of a specific entity - their delegation al-
lows the receiving entity to access resources on behalf
of the other. Drawing this distinction allows them
to introduce constraints required for each category.
However, the main contribution of these proposals is
in discussing the distinction between the delegation
types rather than providing a formal language to ex-
press them. These works have inspired the main ideas
that underlie our proposal.
In the following sections we will introduce a gen-
eral administrative model that is policy agnostic and
therefore adheres to the abstraction level inherent in
UCONABC , while addressing its limitations in defin-
ing, issuing, delegating and dealing with the modifi-
cation of rights and properties.
4 Motivating Example
To clarify the problem that our administrative model
seeks to address, consider the following simple ex-
ample, taken from (Park & Sandhu 2004) which ad-
dresses ‘DRM pay-per-use’ by using UCONpreA1
2. In
this model, two attributes are assumed to exist:
• credit(s): subject’s credit (measurement unit is
money).
• value(o,r): object’s value (the amount of money
for a given right on object).
There are also two policies:
• allowed(s,o,r) ⇐ credit(s) ≥ value(o,r).
• update(credit(s)): credit(s) = credit(s) -
value(o,r).
The policies are intuitively read as: to accept a
request the subject (requesting) must have enough
credit. In that case the subject’s credit is modified
by reducing the value of the object that is being re-
quested and access is granted.
Given the above example, there are three main
points that are assumed and left outside the
UCONABC model.
1. It is not clear who determines the properties such
as subject’s credit and object’s value. Such prop-
erties (in UCONABC term, attributes) belong to
a subject or an object.
2. It is not clear who determines the rights for a
subject on an object. In the above example, al-
lowed(s,o,r).
2The subscript refers to the pre-authorisation with pre-update
policy - interested readers refer to the original paper.
3. Although the modification of such properties is
at the core of UCONABC , policy governing mod-
ification of properties is not explicit. Therefore
it is not practical to determine who can modify
these properties. In the context of the above ex-
ample, it is not clear who can update the credit
property of a subject (i.e., update(credit(s)).
UCONABC simply assumes that update(credit(s))
is performed by system, an entity outside the model,
trusted to do so. By the same token, rights that spec-
ify the relationship between subjects and objects are
assumed to exist and the model does not care about
the origin of the rights.
It is important to appreciate that properties and
rights are subjective by nature. In the real world, at-
tributes and rights are acquired from the sources that
have the authority to provide them. For example, a
subject may acquire credit from a bank or a driving
license from the traffic authority; those dealing with
the subject may trust the bank to honour the pro-
vided credit or not. However, the only entity capable
of modifying a subject’s credit must be the bank or
those somehow appointed by the bank to do so. The
objective of the administrative model for UCONABC
is to address these issues.
5 Administrative Model (M)
Here we introduce a novel approach in representing
administrative functions. We conceptually divide the
UCONABC Administrative Model (M) into, the Peer
Model (MP), that defines an unrestricted basis for es-
tablishing relationships between subjects and objects
through assertions, and the Authoriser Model (MA),
that provides a means for selecting and honouring
some of the existing assertions with respect to an ad-
ministrative policy of the system that implements the
UCONABC model.
M
MP
MA
S
A P
O
Figure 2: Administrative Model (M)
The administrative model, shown in Figure 2, is
abstracted into four major components: Subjects (S)
that are inter-connected, Objects (O) that are admin-
istered, owned or used3 by subjects, Assertions (A)
that specify the relationships between subjects and
objects, and finally the Administrative Policy (P), de-
noting system policy.
We use a specific name when we are addressing
an element of the finite set of S or O. For example
Alice, Bob, Carol ∈ S or File ∈ O. Further, we use
a lower-case letter (e.g., s) when we are addressing a
variable.
5.1 Peer Model (MP): Subjects, Objects,
Assertions
At the heart of the UCONABC model is the concept
of attributes and at the center of MP is the con-
cept of assertion shown in Figure 3. The relationship
3In this paper we consider “use” and “access” to be synonyms.
between assertions and attributes stems from the fact
that assertions in our model generate the attributes of
the UCONABC model. Assertions are also used to ex-
press rights, conditions and obligations of UCONABC
as well.
We generalise an assertion to be a belief statement
expressed by a subject about the properTy (T ) or the
Rights (R)4 of another subject (including themselves)
or an object. An assertion could state various things
such as what is the subject’s role, age, credit balance,
clearance or object’s classification, value or trustwor-
thiness from the issuer’s perspective.
OS A
CB
T R
Figure 3: Assertions A
In relation to expressing conditions and obligations
within MP , we argue that both of these are objects
with properties under the control of a specific subject.
This is a different view from the former access con-
trol models, including UCONABC that consider these
to be a special (type) entity, other than a common
object and considers the subject modifying them to
be external to the model. Their approach results in
a simpler model as they do not need to deal with the
manipulation of these entities by users (subjects).
For example, in UCONABC , local time is consid-
ered as a condition under the control of external sub-
ject, environment. However, in reality, the local time
is the property of an object, system clock, which is un-
der the control of a subject, root in a Unix operating
system. By a similar token, in UCONABC , a user’s
assent to a privacy policy by ticking a policy form
is considered as the discharge of an obligation. In
our model, the policy form could be considered as an
object with a property, filled, that could be assigned
values true or false by a subject (user).
In all the above cases an assertion states that its
issuer believes5 that a subject or an object has a prop-
erty or a right. Through such a treatment we inherit
a subjective view, where properties and rights are al-
ways formed from their issuer’s perspective and are
always valid from that aspect. We refer to such claims
that a subject makes in an assertion as (subjective)
fact. The grammar of facts are shown in Table 1.
There are two types of assertion that could be
written over a fact: a direct assertion and an indi-
rect/delegation assertion. Direct assertions are the
basis of the model and take the form:
s says fact 〈 if fact1. . .factn〉
Informally, a direct assertion states that the sub-
ject believes (says) a fact. The assertion may also be
conditional upon the existence of some other facts as-
serted by the issuer. In the above assertion s ∈ S is
the issuer of the statement, says is a keyword, fact
encodes a specific fact based on the grammar of facts.
4Note that rights, permission or capability can be viewed as a
property; for example granting a right r to a subject can be viewed
as making an assertion that the subject has property r. However,
here for clarity and to be aligned with the UCONABC approach we
consider them to be separate.
5Note that in our paper, believe, assert, state are synonyms, all
mean a subject has made an assertion.
e[s] ::= s (variables)
| s ∈ S (subject)
e[o] ::= o (variables)
| o ∈ O (object)
pred[r ] ::= canRead [o ∈ O] (user-defined (rights) predicates)
| . . .
pred[t] ::= hasCredit [−] (user-defined (property) predicates)
| hasClearance[−]
| . . .
fact ::= e[s] pred[r ]
| e[s] pred[t]
| e[o] pred[t]
Table 1: The Grammar of Facts
The if is an optional keyword, fact1. . .factn are facts
upon which the fact is conditional. The conditional
facts must already exist within the set of assertions
made by s, Assertion Context of s (ACs), in order to
say: s says fact .
Following is an example of three direct assertions
made by three subjects: Bank, Administrator and Al-
ice in an imaginary UCON model. They intuitively
mean Administrator believes that Bob has the clear-
ance level 1; Bank states (believes) that Bob has a
credit limit of $50, and Alice believes the object Book
has a value of $10 for reading purposes.
Admin says Bob hasClearance[1] (1)
Bank says Bob hasCredit[50] (2)
Alice says Book hasValue[10,read] (3)
Direct assertions are less expressive as they are
unable to capture the dependency of a subject on an-
other in order to make an assertion that brings about
the propositional content of a fact. For example, only
using direct assertions, it is not possible for Alice to
depend on Administrator to determine the clearance
property for Bob by:
Alice says Bob hasClearance[1] if
Administrator says Bob hasClearance[1]
This is because the conditional facts in a direct
assertion must be deducible from the issuer’s asser-
tion context, in this case ACAlice. Expressing such a
dependency is the primary requirement in open en-
vironments, where subjects have limited knowledge
about the properties or the rights of others. This
need is addressed by delegation assertions that take
the following form and allow a subject to state its
willingness to believe certain types of facts asserted
by other subjects:
s says s′ can sayD fact 〈 if fact1. . .factn〉
The above delegation assertion introduces an extra
keyword cansayD which introduces the willingness
of the issuer for accepting (believing) the assertions
made by another subject s′ about the fact. The del-
egations have arbitrary but specified depth, where D
defines the possible depth of the delegation and takes
the values n ∈ N . . .∞ where D = 0 means no dele-
gation and ∞ means an unbounded delegation. The
depth of D = 2 means that a subject (e.g., s) may del-
egate the assertion of a fact to another subject (e.g.,
s1) and allow s1 to delegate to others but not allow
these others to delegate further.
Alice says Admin can say0 s hasClearance (4)
Alice says Bank can say0 s hasCredit (5)
For example, given the direct assertions {1,2} and
delegation assertions {4,5}, one (i.e., Alice or any one
having access to assertions) can deduce:
Alice says Bob hasCredit[50] (6)
Alice says Bob hasClearance[1] (7)
As a result the assertion context of Alice ACAlice
would consist of direct assertions {3,6,7}. Notice that
here we assumed subjects (e.g., Alice) are informed
about the assertions made by other subjects in the
model. The details of how such knowledge is shared
and complexities regarding chains of assertion are di-
rectly related to the application employing our model
and several approaches exist to address these issues
e.g., (Li et al. 2003, Blaze et al. 1998).
Notice that through the above treatment, subjects
within a UCONABC model are enabled to make as-
sertions about properties and rights of other subjects
and objects within the model. Further, they can
delegate such assignments to other subjects. Here,
despite UCONABC ’s approach where attributes be-
long to subjects or objects, and where it is not clear
who has specified the policy, properties and rights
only exist from the perspective of their issuers. This
does not necessarily mean that it is universally be-
lieved (by other subjects in the model) that the sub-
ject/object actually has the property/right in ques-
tion. This leads us to the question, how could the
UCONABC model decide whose (subject) perspective
should be relied upon for making an authorisation de-
cision? This question is answered by the authoriser
model.
5.2 Authoriser Model (MA): System policy,
Assertions
The peer model introduces a flexible anarchic model
where no authority is assumed. A subject may make
an assertion about itself, other subjects or objects and
these assertions could be honoured by others through
delegation. However, such an anarchic model is mean-
ingless if there are no means to determine whose as-
sertions are to be taken into account for a UCONABC
usage control decision, which must ultimately involve
one or more subjects who act as the authority root—
whose set of assertions is denoted as ACRoot.
The concept of authority root is inherent in, and
the basis of, all the existing access control models.
However, it is usually assumed fixed and defined out-
side the model itself. For example, in most RBAC
models the authority root is a trusted central ad-
ministrator who is assumed to assign permissions to
roles and roles to users. Based on these assignments,
the model determines whether an access request is
to be granted or denied. ORCON and privacy ori-
ented models consider the owner of the resource as
the authority root and make access control decisions
based on this assumption. Trust Management sys-
tems consider the authority root to be the principal
called local, who writes the local policies. Since these
models are based on predefined views about the root
of authority, none is general enough to model the oth-
ers.
To ensure the flexibility of our administrative
model we bring the concept of authority root into the
model and allow it to be explicitly defined through an
Administrative Policy. The authoriser is defined as a
function shown in Figure 4:
p ∈ P +3
Authoriser
(MA)
+3 ACRoot
AC
KS
Figure 4: System View: Determining Authority Root
where P is a set of possible administrative poli-
cies. An administrative policy p ∈ P precisely states
the rules necessary to determine which subject(s) are
to be considered as the authority root. The AC is
a set of all assertions made by subjects in MP . In
other words, it is the universal set of assertion con-
texts. Given p and AC ,MA determines the assertion
context of the authority root, denoted as ACRoot
6.
Note that when more than one authority root is
specified by p, there is a potential for conflict between
their assertions. The nature of such conflicts depend
on the language used for expressing administrative
policies. Such a language could allow the expression
of hierarchies and would ideally provide mechanisms
for detecting inconsistencies or redundancies. Whilst
the discussion of such conflicts and their resolution is
important for the applicability of our proposal, the fo-
cus of this paper is on introducing an abstract admin-
istrative framework, free from any specific language
or enforcement mechanism. We therefore leave the
introduction of a language to express administrative
policies for future research. Here, we simply specify
administrative policies using the notations used for
expressing facts.
To illustrate the generality of our proposal, in the
following we will provide two examples that corre-
spond to two separate application settings employing
UCONABC . In one an administrator is the root of
authority and in the other, owners of objects are the
authority roots. The former covers a majority of tra-
ditional access control models and the latter addresses
DRM, ORCON and privacy-aware systems.
5.2.1 Administrator-based Model
Let us consider an administrative policy for an or-
ganization’s database that is under the control of a
single administrator, Clare. Intuitively, the policy p
could be trivially written as the following statements:
s isRoot if s isAdministrator
Clare isAdministrator
Now, since Clare is considered as the root of au-
thority for the given application, she may enforce a
DAC policy through the following assertions, which
state, anyone who can read a directory may allow
others to read the files in that directory:
6Note that Root is simply an alias of the subject whom is to be
the authority root, not a distinguished subject.
Clare says s can say∞ s
′ canRead[o] if s
canRead[d], o isElementOf[d]
Or in another instance, she may enforce a MAC
policy to ensure that the users are only allowed to
read the files for which their clearance dominates the
file’s classification:
Clare says s canRead[o] if s isElementof[S], o
isElementOf[O], level[s] ≥ level[o]
Hence, given the administrative policy,MA deter-
mines the ACRoot, which in this case is the assertion
context of the administrator ACClare.
Note that although in the above example we as-
sumed a single administrator for the given applica-
tion, in reality, an application could have many co-
existing administrators and this could be reflected in
the administrative policy. For example, consider an
operating system, where the administrator (the root
user) has privilege over the system objects (e.g, sys-
tem directory, system files, printer, etc.) and the pri-
vate directories of other users on the system are under
their control - they can specify rules for sharing their
own resources.
5.2.2 Owner-Based Model
Let us now consider another scenario where there is a
data store through which subjects can share their doc-
uments with others. However, only the owner of the
resources can express access control rules for them. A
simple administrative policy for such an application
may identify a subject as the authority root if the doc-
ument carries the subject’s signature, and this could
also be simply expressed as:
s isRoot if s signed[o]
Again, assume that there is a subject, Alice who
would like to allow her friends, and their friends to
read the document, Book, she is sharing. To do so,
Alice states her authorisation rules for her book as
below:
Alice says s canRead[Book] if s isFriend (8)
Alice says s can say∞ y isFriend if s isFriend (9)
Alice says Rob isFriend (10)
Given the above assertions, Alice declares Rob as
her friend and through assertions {8,9} allows Rob’s
friends to read the book that Alice is sharing. Now,
if Rob says Mary isFriend, then Mary would also be
able to read Alice’s Book. Lets take this even further
and assume that Alice would like to allow others who
may not be friend to also read the book for a price.
Alice says s canRead[Book] if s
hasCredit[10], s isPaying[10] (11)
From the assertions {3, 5} we can see that Alice
has determined the value of the book and decided
to accept Bank’s assertions regarding the subject’s
credit balance. Using the assertions {11}, she further
ensures that the book can be read by anyone who has
enough credit and (Alice believes) is paying the price
of the book.
The above examples demonstrate how uncon-
trolled assertions in the peer model can be regulated
and managed based on the policy of an application
without restricting our administrative model to any
specific policy.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
The contributions of this paper are three fold. First,
we introduced a novel administrative model based
on two layers of abstraction, capable of represent-
ing both centralised as well as distributed adminis-
trative requirements to address different application
domains. One layer introduces an anarchic environ-
ment where every subject, in addition to being an
access requester, can be an administrator and spec-
ify rights and properties for other subjects or objects.
Another layer introduces constraints based on appli-
cation requirements to identify who can actually ad-
minister and update rights or properties. In this as-
pect, we made the concept of authority root that is
inherent but external to the existing access control
models, explicit and internal. Through this, given an
application’s requirements, theoretically any number
of authority roots could be defined, whom can spec-
ify any policy type or delegate such tasks. Thus the
design delivers a desirable flexibility.
Second, we analysed the administrative problem
in UCONABC and showed how it can be addressed
using existing trust management techniques, as a re-
sult, taking advantage of all the already developed
functionalities (e.g., certificate delegation, revocation,
etc.) that comes with them.
Finally, through concrete examples we showed how
our proposed administrative model can address the
specific problems identified within UCONABC model.
Precisely, the administrator who was considered a
special entity external to the UCONABC model can
now be any subject(s) within the model. An arbi-
trary division of attributes into mutable, modified by
subjects, and immutable, only to be modified by the
administrator, is no longer necessary, since all at-
tributes are made mutable. The arbitrary attribute
modifier system is removed; attributes are source cen-
tric and can only be updated through their issuer or
by those whom have been delegated relevant admin-
istrative authority over them.
We envisage the immediate future direction is to
adopt one of the existing trust management languages
to develop an administrative toolkit based on the
concepts introduced in this paper. The developed
framework is aimed towards a current application of
UCONABC in collaborative environments, such as the
one proposed by Zhang et al., (Zhang et al. 2006).
Further, we would like to examine the potential con-
flicts that may arise due to assertions made by multi-
ple authority roots and introduce approaches to deal
with them.
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